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Changing Repertoires of Contention 
in Hong Kong: A Case Study on the 
Anti-Extradition Bill Movement
Introduction
The movement opposing the Extradition Law Amendment Bill (反對修訂逃犯條例 faandeoi saudeng toufaan tiulai, below Anti-ELAB movement) in Hong Kong has reignited a new protest cycle after a 
period of abeyance following the 2014 Umbrella movement (UM). Back in 
February 2019, the HKSAR government put forward a proposal to amend 
existing ordinances to allow Hong Kong to detain and transfer fugitives to 
countries and territories where there is no formal extradition agreement, 
including mainland China. Although the bill, according to government 
officials, was triggered by a 2018 murder case in Taipei, public concern 
about the authorities’ motivations gradually turned into contention inside 
and outside the Legislative Council (LegCo). After massive demonstrations 
in June 2019, unceasing waves of protests have expanded the imaginations 
and modes of political resistance among Hong Kong citizens. In terms of 
movement strategy, the organic combination of “peaceful, rational, and 
non-violent” (woleifei 和理非) actions and “militant” (jungmou 勇武) 
confrontations demonstrated an unanticipated evolution of the contentious 
repertoire of Hong Kong social movements. Indeed, this seemingly dramatic 
change emerged incrementally from a specific political context, rather than 
transforming rapidly.
This short article examines how the Anti-ELAB movement reconfigured 
former movement experiences and produced new meanings of political 
resistance in Hong Kong. It begins with a brief review of the development of 
the contentious repertoire in post-handover Hong Kong before the debate 
over the extradition law amendment in early 2019. After contextualisation, 
the article then focuses on the three distinctive dynamics underlying the 
parallel forms of action that have emerged between June 2019 and January 
2020. In order to capture the trajectory of changing repertoires, original data 
gathered from protest onsite surveys will be presented, complemented by 
press reviews. These onsite surveys were carried out by a team of researchers 
from four Hong Kong universities at nearly all major protests during this 
period, assisted by a group of trained helpers.1 
Contentious repertoire in post-handover Hong Kong
As a hybrid regime, Hong Kong had rarely witnessed highly disruptive 
or even violent social mobilisations either before or after the transfer of 
sovereignty because of its institutional setting and conservative protest 
culture (Ku 2007; Fong 2013; Cheng 2016). Even after the momentous 
H I U - F U N G  C H U N G
demonstration against National Security Legislation on 1st July 2003, mass 
protests and rallies tended to follow the principal of being “peaceful, rational, 
and non-violent” (woping, leising, feiboulik 和平, 理性, 非暴力), seeking 
government concessions through large turnouts (Cheng 2016). Although 
some protests adopted more direct forms of action, such as occupation 
(zimling 佔領) during the pier protection campaigns in 2006 and 2007, 
most were non-violent and symbolic in a bid to appeal to broader society 
(ibid.). Although they addressed a variety of issues, these peaceful protests 
all sought to protect diminishing civic freedom and to liberalise the quasi-
democratic political system of this city (Ma 2007). From the early 2010s 
onward, a new form of activism focused on livelihood issues rooted in the 
increasing interactions between Hong Kong and mainland China emerged 
across residential neighbourhoods, and adopted more confrontational actions 
targeting tourists, new migrants, and parallel traders from the mainland 
(Chen and Szeto 2015; Yuen and Chung 2018). Nevertheless, not until the 
movement to Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP, Joeng ngoi jyu 
woping zimling zungwaan 讓愛與和平佔領中環) and the subsequent UM 
did Hong Kong’s contentious repertoire undergo a significant transformation 
in terms of scale and intensity of participation. 
The emergence of OCLP should be understood in the context of 
political setbacks in Hong Kong’s democratisation. As stated in the Basic 
Law, universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive and for the 
Legislative Council (LegCo) in Hong Kong was supposed to be achieved 
as early as 2007 and 2008, but the arrangement was rejected and further 
postponed by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (Quanguo 
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui 全國人民代表大會常務委
員會) in 2006. At the same time, routinised mass protests had gradually 
lost their disruptive and shocking impact. In the face of stagnation of 
democratisation, pro-democracy activists began contemplating the necessity 
and justification of more radical means. Against this backdrop, legal scholar 
Benny Tai 戴耀廷 proposed occupying the city’s core financial district in 
order to force the Beijing and Hong Kong governments to make concessions 
on democratic reform in early 2013. After more than one-and-a-half years of 
preparation, the planned campaign transformed spontaneously into the UM, 
marked by police use of tear gas on 28 September 2014. 
1. The research team was led by Professor Francis Lee L. F. of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Dr. Samson Yuen of Lingnan University, Dr. Gary Tang of The Hang Seng University of Hong Kong, 
and Dr. Edmund W. Cheng of City University of Hong Kong. The author was an onsite coordinator 
for more than ten surveys and was responsible for preliminary analysis of the survey data. For a 
detailed discussion on the survey methodology, please refer to Yuen (2019).
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What both local and international societies witnessed in the following 
79 days was the largest civil disobedience campaign in contemporary Hong 
Kong history. Early on, the regime shifted its response to this unpredicted 
event from a strategy of repression to attrition, effectively creating a 
stalemate (Yuen and Cheng 2017). On the movement’s side, internal 
dissension over action escalation and central leadership eventually widened 
the cleavage between woleifei and jungmou protesters, undermining the 
morale of participants as time went on.
The failure of the UM resulted in further movement radicalisation, notably 
marked by “localism” (buntou zyuji  本土主義) and its growing appeal to 
young people in Hong Kong. Historically speaking, localism in Hong Kong 
originated from left-wing progressive activism in the mid-2000s, and was 
adopted by right-wing activists to articulate their anti-mainland political 
agenda starting in the early 2010s (Ku 2012; Chen and Szeto 2015). In 
the aftermath of the UM, new political groups such as Youngspiration 
(Cingnin sanzing 青年新政) and Hong Kong Indigenous (Buntou manzyu 
cinsin 本土民主前線) quickly appropriated the discourse of localism that 
called for a more ideologically radical, pro-independence political agenda. 
Calling for priority to be given to Hongkongers, these localist activists 
used more confrontational repertoires in some “recovery operations” 
(gwongfuk hangdung 光復行動) whilst targeting mainlanders in residential 
neighbourhoods during the years 2015 and 2016. 
The Mongkok civil unrest (Wonggok soulyun 旺角騷亂) in February 2016 
brought tactical radicalisation to a new climax. To counter the government 
crackdown on unlicensed street vendors, Hong Kong Indigenous mobilised 
its supporters to protect hawkers whom hygiene officers had attempted to 
remove, as well as to preserve local street market culture (Yuen and Chung 
2020). The action escalated after the police arrived to carry out crowd 
control operations, with protesters adopting more confrontational means, 
such as digging bricks out of the pavement and throwing glass bottles 
at police officers (Chan and Ng 2017). From then on, more conflictual 
interactions between protesters and the police appeared in Hong Kong’s 
street politics. As Yuen and Chung (2018) highlighted, despite a violent 
outcome, the localist camp actually gained more popularity and sympathy, 
as indicated by the 15% of votes that went to localist candidate Edward 
Leung (梁天琦) in the 2016 LegCo by-election, although public support of 
radical action remained low on a broader scale.2 
In order to supress nascent radicalism, the regime adopted a hard-line 
approach to delegitimise the localist camp as well as to hamper the pro-
democracy movement (Yuen and Chung 2018; Cheng 2020). Targeted 
repression via legal and political measures was illustrated by the fact that 
many arrested in the Mongkok clashes were charged for rioting, assaulting 
police officers, and other associated crimes. Between April 2018 and 
June 2019, 23 of them were found guilty of rioting and sentenced to the 
maximum term of imprisonment. In late 2018, nine leading figures of the 
UM were charged with incitement to commit public nuisance, incitement to 
incite public nuisance and other related crimes.3 The oath-taking controversy 
in late 2016 (Yuen and Chung 2018) was followed by disqualification of 
elected lawmakers and prohibition of electoral participation by proponents 
of Hong Kong independence and self-determination.4 What followed 
between late 2016 and early 2019 was a period of abeyance for the Hong 
Kong pro-democracy movement, with a decline in people’s perceived 
collective efficacy in influencing political process and the absence of large-
scale mobilisation (Lee, Yuen, Tang, and Cheng 2019).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the conditions and resources for 
mass mobilisation remained in place because of dissatisfaction towards 
unimproved governance and social inequality remained unrelieved, coupled 
with the sustaining of movement networks at the grassroots level (Chung 
2019; Lee et al . 2019). 
Dynamics of contention in the Anti-ELAB movement
As shown in the previous discussion, incremental change in the 
contentious repertoire in post-handover Hong Kong was primarily driven 
by the cumulative experience of social movement and regime intervention 
(Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 19-20). Before explaining the underlying dynamics of 
change in repertoire, it is helpful to recap how the momentum of the Anti-
ELAB movement was built up. 
The extradition bill definitely aroused immense concern from the public 
following the release of the amendment proposal in February because of 
local citizens’ deep distrust toward the mainland legal system. However, as 
the Hong Kong government failed to lessen people’s worries, the 28 April 
demonstration initiated by Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) unexpectedly 
attracted the largest turnout for a rally since the aftermath of the UM.5 
Inside the LegCo, intense debates took place in May 2019, while more than 
270,000 signatures of Hong Kong citizens were collected through various 
online petitions against the amendment proposal before one million citizens 
protested in the streets on 9 June.6 The first use of tear gas by police three 
days later during the clashes in Admiralty and Central was a critical moment. 
Protesters arrested on 12 June were charged with rioting for the first time 
during the Anti-ELAB movement. Regarding this unexpected repression, CHRF 
called for another demonstration on 16 June during which “five demands” 
(ng daai soukau 五大訴求) were officially presented. From then on, the “five 
demands” became a collective action frame that gave legitimacy to various 
movement activities in the subsequent months (Benford and Snow 2000). 
Coined by localist leader Edward Leung in his election campaign in 2016, the 
prevailing slogan “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” (Gwongfuk 
Hoenggong, sidoi gaakming 光復香港, 時代革命) in the meantime began 
to gain more popularity among movement supporters, representing people’s 
“vivid revolutionary imagination unthought of before” (Ku 2020). What 
made this extraordinary uprising “revolutionary” can be understood in three 
interrelated aspects.
2. According to a public opinion survey during March 2016, around 70% of Hong Kong citizens 
agreed that people should always follow peaceful and non-violent means when struggling with the 
authorities and striving for their own demands. See “Survey Findings on Views on Social Conflict 
in Hong Kong Released by Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at CUHK,” Communications 
and Public Relations Office, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 6 April 2016, https://www.cpr.
cuhk.edu.hk/en/press_detail.php?1=1&1=1&id=2230&t=survey-findings-on-views-on-social-
conflict-in-hong-kong-released-by-hong-kong-institute-of-asia-pacific-studies-at-cuhk (accessed 
on 24 February 2020). 
3. Holmes Chan, “Leading Hong Kong Umbrella Movement activists found guilty of public nuisance,” 
Hong Kong Free Press, 9 April 2019, https://hongkongfp.com/2019/04/09/breaking-hong-kong-
umbrella-movement-activists-handed-verdicts-public-nuisance-trial/ (accessed on 24 February 
2020). 
4. “衆志倡民主自決, 周庭被DQ 選舉主任指沒有真心真誠擁護基本法” (Zungz i coeng 
manzyuzikyut, Zau Ting bei DQ syungeoizyujam zi mutjau zansam zansing jungwu geibunfaat, 
Demosisto advocates democratic self-determination, Agnes Chow is disqualified by returning 
officer for her insincerity toward the Basic Law), Ming Pao, 28 January 2018, https://news.mingpao.
com/pns/%e8%a6%81%e8%81%9e/article/20180128/s00001/1517077081428 (accessed on 
30 June 2020). 
5. “影像: 反逃犯條例修訂大遊行, 民陣指人數高達13萬” (Jingzoeng: faantoufaantiulaisaudeng 
daai jauhang manzan zi jansou goudaat 13 maan, Image: CHRF claims more than 130,000 people 
joining anti-extradition bill amendment protest), Initium Media, 28 April 2019, https://theinitium.
com/article/20190428-photo-extradition-law-protest/ (accessed on 24 February 2020). 
6. “反引渡修例聯署合集” (Faanjandou saulai lyuncyu hapzaap, The collection of Anti-ELAB 
petitions,” Citizen News, 9 June 2019, https://www.hkcnews.com/FOO-petitions/ (accessed on 24 
February 2020).
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Solidarity with diversity
Within the movement, a high and persistent degree of solidarity within 
diversity provided a normative ground for tactical radicalisation and 
innovation of parallel repertoires beyond street politics. Codified by action 
protocols such as “no splitting and no severing of ties” (bat fanfaa, bat gotzik 
不分化, 不割席) and “brothers climbing a mountain together, each one 
with their own effort” (hingdai paasaan, gokzi noulik 兄弟爬山, 各自努力), 
this norm of solidarity first redressed the cleavage between pacifism and 
militancy during and after the UM. It also united supporters from different 
biographical availabilities and action orientations, giving impetus to a 
popular movement with diverse social bases.
Figure 1. A poster with the slogans “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of our Times” and “Hongkongers, 
resist!” Credit: ANTIELAB Research Data Archive.
Figure 2. Graffiti stating “Disband Hong Kong Police” during the protest on 1st October 2019. Credit: 
Dorothy Wong.
7. The sample size of the 18 August survey was 806.
8. Hillary Leung, “Hong Kong Student Who Fell from Height During a Protest Dies,” Time, 8 
November 2019, https://time.com/5721979/hong-kong-student-brain-injury-death/ (accessed 
on 24 February 2020). 
9. Hiu-Fung Chung 鍾曉烽, “不斷抗爭, 持續 ‘升級’: 反修例運動參與者的民意走向” (Bat 
tyun kongzang, cizuk ‘sing kap’: faan saulai wandung samjyuze dik manji zauhoeng, Anti-ELAB 
protesters’ opinion on movement escalation), Stand News, 13 August 2019, https://www.
thestandnews.com/politics/不斷抗爭-持續-升級-反修例運動參與者的民意走向/ (accessed 
on 24 February 2020).
Figure 3. Protesters occupying Harcourt Road in Admiralty on 1st July 2019. Credit: Dorothy Wong.
officers (93.5%).7 When the emergency bill was announced in October 2019, 
the movement slogan “Hongkongers, add oil (keep it up)!” (Hoenggongjan, 
gaajau! 香港人, 加油!) shifted to “Hongkongers, resist!” (Hoenggongjan, 
faankong! 香港人,反抗!), reframing and repositioning the city-wide 
contention towards an open battle against government repression (Ting 
2020). After the tragic death of a 22-year-old university student in November 
2019,8 the new slogan of “Hongkongers, revenge!” (Hoenggongjan, bousau! 
香港人, 報仇!) represented even stronger resentment towards the regime. 
Among the protesters surveyed during the Human Rights Day march on 8 
December, 80.4% strongly agreed that the militant protesters had sacrificed 
themselves for the peaceful protesters, and 68.7% felt guilty when seeing 
them arrested. The combination of guilt and anger is often a powerful driver 
of social movements in solidarity with powerless others (Rodgers 2010).
Moreover, this sense of affective solidarity incorporates a pragmatic 
consideration alongside the impulse for movement escalation. According to 
most onsite surveys conducted between June and August 2019, more than 
90% of the protesters surveyed believed the protests should continue if the 
government did not make any concession beyond suspending the bill, while 
around half supported further protest escalation.9 Within the same period, 
the percentage of participants who agreed that combining peaceful and 
confrontation actions had the most effect increased from 79.6% on 17 June 
to nearly 90% on 25 August, and the figure remained constant over the next 
four months (Table 1). 
On the one hand, solidarity is essentially affective. Social movement 
scholars have highlighted the importance of emotion in motivating 
collective actions and constructing collective identity (Jasper 2011). By 
calling their counterparts “hands-and-feet” (sauzuk 手足), protesters showed 
strong emotional attachment to each other, regardless of whether they 
had actual personal connections. As the movement went on, accumulated 
grievance towards police brutality and unresponsive government reinforced 
the affective solidarity within the movement. According to the onsite 
survey conducted on 18 August, an exceptionally large number of protesters 
surveyed felt anger towards the HKSAR government (92.2%) and police 
Diffusion of escalated contention
Diffusion refers to a process of spreading forms of contention, an issue 
or particular framing from one site of struggle to another (Tilly and Tarrow 
2015: 31). Stepping towards July 2019, street politics went beyond the 
standard locations and familiar routes in previous mass mobilisations. 
An array of small-scale protests emerged across residential communities 
(sekeoi 社區). Different professional groups, such as journalists, lawyers, 
flight attendants, creative workers, and civil servants, organised their own 
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demonstrations, and even joined political strikes in a rare move for Hong 
Kong’s pro-democracy movement (Chan and Pun 2020).
Similar to many networked protests, the rapid diffusion of contention in 
the Anti-ELAB movement was highly related to the decentralised, horizontal 
organisation afforded by the extensive use of social media and mobile 
technology. In particular, the online forum LIHKG (Lindang touleonkeoi 連
登討論區) and a bundle of Telegram groups functioned together as central 
communication platforms for immediate onsite tactics and deliberation 
over long-term strategies. As a Reddit-like platform, LIHKG facilitates the 
crowdsourcing of leadership connected to robust feedback loops (Ting 
2020). Compared to other popular platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram 
is considered by protesters to be a more reliable encrypted messaging tool 
that can provide higher security and protection. For street confrontation, 
platformised coordination enacted the motto of “be water” (jyuseoi 如
水) in stark contrast to the static occupying strategy during UM. As many 
commentators have already pointed out, conflictual interactions between 
Anti-ELAB protesters and the police force added fuel to the escalation of 
violence from both sides (Lee 2019b; Ku 2020; Ting 2020). While police-
protester clashes had diffused to residential areas, it increased the chance for 
movement bystanders to perceive police use of indiscriminate and excessive 
violence. According to a public opinion survey carried out in mid-November, 
83% and 73% agreed that the HKSAR government and the police force, 
respectively, were overwhelmingly responsible for the escalation of violence, 
but only around 40% blamed the protesters.10 The public receptiveness 
of radical tactics was also supported by strong public approval of the 
movement goals, unresponsive authorities, and police brutality (Lee 2019a). 
In response to police misconduct and the desire for truth-seeking over 
contested events,11 protesters launched a series of Citizens’ Press Conference 
(Mangaan geizewui 民間記者會) as platforms for protesters, victims of 
police abuse, and experts to speak out.
At the same time, moderate protesters “escalated” their engagement 
by creating a wide range of peaceful activities throughout the movement, 
ranging from collective singing of the movement anthem “Glory to Hong 
Kong” (Jyunwing gwonggwai Hoenggong 願榮光歸香港) to forming “human 
chains” along metro lines. These will be elaborated in the next section. Indeed, 
diffusion went beyond local society. The extensive global outreach of the Anti-
ELAB movement represents a watershed in Hong Kong movement history 
(Ku 2020), ranging from media campaigns and thematic demonstrations in 
different foreign cities to non-governmental public diplomacy.12
Table 1. Protesters’ views on tactical radicalisation (from June to December 2019) 
    Jun 17  Jul 1  Jul 21   Aug 18   Aug 25   Sep 15   Oct 14  Oct 20   Dec 8
 Radical protests can force the government to listen  
53.2 40.5 54.3 48.9 55.4 62.2 66.1 62.4 65.2
 to the people. 
 
 Radical protests will alienate the general public 61.2 54.9 33.1 37.4 24.5 27.6 35.8 30 26.8
 Only when peaceful assembly and confrontational  
 actions are used together can the impact of protest  79.6 71.0 81.6 86.1 89.8 89.1 90.3 90.6 90.2
 be maximised
 When the government fails to listen, the use of  
/ 83.5 94.7 94.2 94.6 91.9 98.2 97.5 97.5
 radical tactics by protesters is understandable
 N = 717 1169 680 806 395 911 662 921 902  
Note: Respondents were required to indicate to what extent they agree with these statements. The figures show the percentage of respondents who chose “agree” and  “strongly agree.”  Other choices include “so-so,” 
“disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know”.
Figure 4. A poster promoting the yellow economic circle. Credit: ANTIELAB Research Data Archive.
10. “民調: 逾八成受訪者稱政府警方需為暴力升溫負很大責任” (Mandiu: jyu baats ing 
saufongze cing zingfu gingfong seoi wai boulik singwan fu handaai zaakjam, Public opinion 
survey: more than 80% of interviewees believe government and police are largely responsible for 
violence escalation,” Radio Television Hong Kong, 15 November 2019, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/
ch/component/k2/1492480-20191115.htm? (accessed on 24 February 2020).
11. The 21 July Yuen Long attack and 31 August Prince Edward metro station protest were two 
prominent cases.
12. Further elaboration on movement internalisation would be helpful, but it is beyond the limited 
scope of this short article.
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Deepening everyday politicisation
Also noteworthy was a development towards everyday politicisation, 
referring to the process of inventing alternative ways and practices of 
performing and enacting politics in ordinary and “normal” settings (Roussos 
2019). The politicisation of everyday life in the Anti-ELAB movement was 
characterised by widespread connective action, community activism, and 
economic resistance, especially in the latter months of protest. Table 2 
captures the general pattern of Anti-ELAB protesters’ individual participation 
between September 2019 and January 2020.
Moving towards July, many urban public spaces were filled with “Lennon 
Walls” (Linnung coeng 連儂牆).13 Hong Kong pro-democracy supporters 
started to create a Hong Kong Lennon Wall using Post-it sticky notes and 
other creative displays outside the headquarters of the HKSAR government 
in Admiralty during the UM. From that time on, the colourful mosaic has 
become a spatial practice and expressive channel for citizens to voice their 
dissent. Other new community-based expressive actions such as “human 
chains” and belting out slogans at home were gradually routinised, sustaining 
a sense of involvement for movement supporters.
The most remarkable everyday resistance was political consumerism. 
From September 2019 to January 2020, the protesters surveyed who 
had buycotted pro-movement businesses (“yellow” shops, wongdim 黃
店) increased significantly from 69.9% to 98.9%, while boycotting pro-
government or pro-police businesses (“blue” shops, laamdim 藍店) also 
showed a steady rise over those months (Table 2). For the first time, the 
Hong Kong pro-democracy movement employed economic means of action 
to create “alternative political resources in an acute imbalanced bargaining 
structure between protesters and the government” (Chan and Pun 2020). 
Although it is still too early to judge whether or not this economic leverage 
could bring substantial political rewards as long as the economic structure 
does not change (ibid.), these habitual practices actually resulted in revenue 
drops for some protester-targeted “blue” businesses such as Best Mart 360 
and Maxim’s Group.14 Facilitated by mobile apps that list the locations and 
information of “yellow” shops, the pro-movement “yellow economic circle” 
(wongsik ginzaihyun 黃色經濟圈) was formed and enacted in an attempt 
to counter the influence of Chinese capital and to achieve a sustainable and 
autonomous local economy in the long term.
Hiu-Fung Chung – Changing Repertoires of Contention in Hong Kong
Table 2. Individual means of participation (from September 2019 to January 2020)
    Sep 15  Sep 28 Oct 1  Oct 14   Oct 20   Dec 8   Jan 1
 Frontline protest  
  Pass on resources to the frontline 46 50.6 34.8 52.3 39.4 53.5 48.4
  Stop police advances 9 9.1 3.1 12.7 6.5 13.5 13.1
  Protest outside police station / / / / 17.5 / / 
 Resource donations
  Donate money to protest-related groups 42.2 59.3 53.1 42.1 44.2 44.5 49.2 
  Donate money online 46.7 51.9 47.2 54.5 48.2 41.7 43.6
  Donate resources other than money 43.7 46.2 38.6 47.3 41 47.3 46.1
 Community activism
  Sing “Glory to Hong Kong” publicly 78.2 80.5 77 86.1 79.4 78.9 77.6
  Express opinion on “Lennon Wall” 67.6 69.1 61.6 67.2 56.6 60.7 60.4
  Shout protest slogan from window at home 55.3 53.6 48.6 52.6 47 53.7 55.6
  Lunchtime flash-mob / / / / / 33.9 31.4
  Join “human chain” 64 64.9 61.4 64 57.8 61.3 56.5
 Economic resistance
  Participate in any form of strike / / / / / 57.7 52.8
  Buycott pro-movement business / 69.9 68.4 86.4 81.3 98.8 98.9
  Boycott pro-government business / 86.2 83.4 89.7 88.5 98.5 98.1 
 Online and connective action
  Share pro-movement messages and information 78.2 82.7 74.5 83.7 78.4 75.4 76.4
  Express pro-movement opinions online 74.4 74.1 67.3 79.3 72.4 71.2 72
  Sign online petition  79.6 89.6 81.7 90.3 86.3 79.1 81.6
 None of the above  0.7 0 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.6 0.5 
 N = 911 405 640 662 921 902 1306
Note: The figures are the percentage of respondents who have participated in that kind of protest activity.
13. This practice refers to the Prague Lennon Wall, a monument to John Lennon’s peace ideals 
created after his death and representing the pursuit of free speech and non-violent rebellion by 
young Czech people against the communist regime during the 1980s.
14. “優品 360 盈利急挫八成 稱社會運動打壓營商環境” (Jauban 360 jinglei gapco baatsing cing 
sewuiwandung daangaat jingsoengwaanging, Drastic decrease in profit Mart 360 claims social 
movement impeding business environment), StandNews, 24 June 2020 (accessed on 30 June 
2020); Jinshan Hong and Yvonne Man, “Chain Hated by Hong Kong Protesters Sees Double Digit 
Drop,” Bloomberg, 19 November 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-18/
chain-store-hated-by-hong-kong-protesters-sees-double-digit-drop (accessed on 24 February 
2020). 
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Concluding remarks
This short essay attempts to contextualise the evolution of the 
contentious repertoire throughout Anti-ELAB movement and analyses its 
underlying dynamics. At the time of writing, the unceasing waves of protest 
still had no end in sight. On 24 November 2019, the pro-democracy camp 
won 85% of the seats in District Council elections. This unexpected landslide 
victory has critical implications for the LegCo elections in late 2020, as well 
as for the 2021 Chief Executive election. It is foreseeable that, under the new 
governing principle of “total governance” (quanmian guanzhi 全面管治) 
since 2014, the Beijing government will adopt a more repressive approach to 
Hong Kong in handling dissents in the future.
Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Anti-ELAB 
movement entered a period of “enforced abeyance” (beibik jauzi 被迫休
止) in early February 2020, yet contentious campaigns have not totally 
died down.15 As sociologist Ching-kwan Lee pointed out, the Anti-ELAB 
Movement itself is a “permanent revolution” (winggau gaakming 永久革命), 
and is in the process of constructing a “Hong Kong community” (Hoenggong 
gungtungtai 香港共同體) based on affective solidarity and flexible forms 
of resistance rooted in people’s everyday lives.16 With the enactment of the 
Hong Kong National Security Law (Gongkeoi gwokngonfaat 港區國安法) 
on 30 June 2020, Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters now face a higher 
risk of punishment, and whether citizens’ political freedoms can be protected 
remains unclear. Furthermore, many people also fear the erosion of Hong 
Kong’s judicial independence because its unique common law jurisdiction 
does not align with China’s judicial system (Chan 2018). Nevertheless, 
after a summer of freedom and a traumatic autumn in 2019, this popular 
movement has already become a “long revolution” against authoritarian 
encroachment. 
I Hiu-Fung Chung is a research assistant in the Department of Public 
Policy at the City University of Hong Kong. Room B7506, Yeung Kin 
Man Academic Building, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, 
Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR (hfchung@cityu.edu.hk).
15. Francis Lee Lap-fung 李立峰, “社會運動下的抗疫和抗疫下的社會運動” (Sewuiwandung haa 
dik kongjik wo kongjik haa dik sewuiwandung, Anti-pandemic during social movement and social 
movement in the anti-pandemic era), Ming Pao, 20 February 2020, https://news.mingpao.com/
ins/%E6%96%87%E6%91%98/article/20200220/s00022/1582098559971 (accessed on 30 
June 2020).
16. Ching-kwan Lee 李靜君, “‘觸動靈魂深處的反送中革命’ 社會學解析” (‘Zukdung lingwan 
samcyu dik faansungzung gaakming’ sewuihok gaaisik, A sociological analysis of the “soul-
touching” Anti-ELAB movement), The Storm Media, 1st December 2019, https://www.storm.mg/
article/2010112 (accessed on 24 February 2020).
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